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Article 3

IN APPRECIATION: PAUL G. HASKELL
JUDITH WELCH WEGNER*

Academics are known for their respect for tradition.
Universities endeavor to preserve and transmit the knowledge of past
generations. Commencement ceremonies feature ceremonial garb
dating from centuries past. Journals, like this one, remember and
commemorate the life and work of faculty members who have
touched the lives of their students and their colleagues. All of us at
UNC are grateful that Paul Haskell has allowed us to honor his
tenure in this fashion.
Other colleagues share memories of their friendship with Paul in
the essays that follow. My comments can accordingly be brief. Paul
has provided much spice to our life here at Carolina. When he joined
the UNC faculty in 1977, he provided fresh insights based on his
experience at Georgetown and at Case Western Reserve. While at
UNC, Paul was named as Graham Kenan Professor and later as
William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor, in recognition of his scholarly
accomplishments in the field of property law and trusts and estates.
As others have attested, he has given unstintingly of his opinions, his
time, and his dry wit in a continuing quest to keep his colleagues and
students honest, to open their minds, and to spur them to be the best
they can be. At the same time he has kept us focused on those
intangible, finer things of life: Boston, Harvard College, and
baseball.
I will remember Paul for the example he set in shaping and
reshaping his life as a teacher and thinker. When he found that
students in his trust and estates class lacked engagement, he
reinvented the course to incorporate more use of problems. When he
concluded that there was need for more active discussion of lawyers'
roles and values, he gathered an active and talented group to engage
in extracurricular discussion. When he determined that a new
approach to teaching and writing about legal ethics was warranted, he
designed new courses and used the power of the pen to espouse his
views to the profession and the populace.
I am sure that Paul's many students join me and his colleagues in
wishing him and his wife Sally the very best on the occasion of his
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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retirement.

THOMAS F. BERGIN**

Some Thoughts From a Co-Author
I welcome this opportunity to write some words about Paul G.
Haskell on the occasion of his retirement from the University of
North Carolina School of Law. I start by recounting a lie that I told
two years ago while flying to Indiana to teach law and economics to
trial judges. During the flight, the young woman sitting next to me
reached into her travel bag, took out a copy of Paul's and my Preface
to Estates in Land and FutureInterests,' and turned to a page near the
end of the book. "You must be a law student," I said to her. "How
did you know?" she asked. "That book," I replied; "how do you like
it?" "The first half was absolutely grim;" she said, "nothing but
feudal law." "That was Haskell's half," I lied; "I wrote the half
you're reading now." "Oh, wow!" she said, "you're the Bergin of
Bergin and Haskell?" "None other," I replied, giving her that
bashful smile that I had perfected at the age of eight. I felt like a
movie star. Was the lie justified? Of course. She would have been
horrified to be told that I had written the half that she had described
as grim. But on the rather good chance that God disagrees with my
assessment, I will, one day, as an act of contrition, read Paul's half.
Maybe as early as next year. Fair enough?
This year, Paul and I are sharing a fiftieth anniversary that I'll
bet has not crossed his mind. In the fall of 1948, Paul entered
Harvard Law School and I entered Yale Law School. Since no one
who could have gone to Yale Law School at that time would have
gone to Harvard, I infer that Paul didn't have quite enough of the
right stuff. But what the heck, you don't blame a guy for something
that's not his fault. Right?
Oh nuts! Am I going to have to get soggy about Haskell here? I
come from the wrong generation to do that. Paul knows already that
there is no one whom I admire and respect more than him. We have
been close friends since we first met as entering associates at the Wall
Street firm of Kelley, Drye, Newhall and Maginnes in 1951. That's
** William Minor Lile Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Virginia School of

Law.
1. THoMAs F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1984).
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forty-seven years. We practiced law together for five years. He was
as able a lawyer as I have ever known. We were both New Deal
Democrats and I can remember the beach where, with a gang of
other Democrats, we listened on a portable radio to Adlai
Stevenson's acceptance speech at the Democratic nominating
convention. I rapped out grounders to his sons when they were Little
Leaguers. And he and his wife, Sally, were as uncle and aunt to my
daughter. We wrote a book together, and we took counsel with one
another countless times on articles we were working on. Six years
ago, he got me the chance to earn some dollars (far too few) by
delivering an address at the University of North Carolina Law School
on lawyers' advancing the immoral (but legal) goals of their clients.
There are, I must say, weirdnesses in the way our lives and
careers have paralleled one another's. I am going to try to account
for one of those parallels here. But let me first just point to a few:
Haskell started teaching law at Georgetown in 1962. Bergin at
Virginia in 1963. Haskell's major first-year course: property.
Bergin's? Property. Haskell's favorite course (after property): law
and morality. (If it wasn't, it ought to have been.) Bergin's? Law
and morality. Haskell's strongest current academic interest: lawyer
ethics. Bergin's? The same.
The parallel that I attempt to explain here is our common
interest in lawyer ethics. I have not written on the subject; but I have
delivered at least three addresses to bar groups on it and I have made
it a central focus of two of my graduation speeches at Virginia. Paul
published this year a book on the subject entitled Why Lawyers
Behave As They Do.2 I do the readers of this essay a true favor by
recommending the book to them. If proof were needed that Paul's
mind is as fiercely sharp today as it was back in the early 1950s, this
book would supply it in abundance. But no one who knows Paul
needs the proof.
The scary proposition that Paul advances in the book is that a
good number of the ethical rules that govern the conduct of lawyers,
far from requiring lawyers to conform in their professional labors to
accepted moral principles, invite them or even compel them to ignore
those principles. He not only advances the proposition, but also
proves its correctness with over twenty hypothetical cases that he
presents in the beginning of his book and analyzes in detail later. A
good number of the hypothetical cases were based on actual cases.
I present just one example from his book. An accused, charged
2. PAuL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE As THEY Do (1998).
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with having robbed a pedestrian, has admitted his guilt to his lawyer.
The lawyer knows that a woman who witnessed the crime will testify
truthfully that the accused did it. May the lawyer, on crossexamining the witness, attempt to discredit her truthful testimony by
bringing out the facts that she had several convictions for shoplifting,
that she had been drinking that night, and that she had had a violent
argument with the accused earlier in the evening? 3 The Model Rules
bar a lawyer from knowingly using false testimony for his client, but
they do not bar his attempting to discredit testimony against his client
that he knows is true. Yet, the successful discrediting of testimony
that one knows is true is, arguably at least, morally indistinguishable
from knowingly using false testimony. In one respect, it is plainly
worse; for the discrediting process, in addition to misleading the jury
as much as false evidence would, commonly unjustly harms the truth
teller. One simply throws one's hands in the air when one attempts
to find moral worth in the process. But the dismaying point, of
course, is that the Model Rules, by not barring the process, make
discrediting the only course open to the lawyer for the accused; for
what defense lawyer, knowing that the Model Rules do not bar him
from discrediting the truth teller, will dare not to do it?
The idea that rules of ethics might be guiding lawyers to
unethical conduct is, to me, a deeply troubling one. Long before
reading Paul's book, I had thought that we American lawyers had
gone overboard, at least in some respects, on the requirement that we
be zealous advocates of our clients' interests. But Paul demonstrates
that the effect of the rules may be more baleful than I had ever
imagined. Although the book is aimed at a general audience, I judge
it must reading for every lawyer who is concerned about the role of
the lawyer in contemporary American society.
But if Paul convinces us that the rules do, in fact, authorize or
even compel unethical conduct by lawyers, we shall surely be left
wondering how it came about that the rules got to be the way they
are. Were they purposely designed to enable unethical conduct? If
they were, then it was not the rules that brought about unethicalness;
it was unethicalness that brought about the rules. My fear is that it
was the latter.
Here is Cornell Law School's Roger C. Cramton speaking in a
1984 address about the lawyer who is negotiating or litigating with an
unrepresented party:
The older ethic of the profession counseled fairness to the
3. See id. at 2.
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adversary. The modem ideology is that unrepresented or
inexperienced parties are entitled to no favors-running
over a patsy is accepted behavior. The early versions of the
new model rules attempted to resuscitate the publicresponsibility ethic by enjoining lawyers from "unfairly
exploiting ignorance of the law ... " and "procur[ing] an

unconscionable result." In response to vehement bar
opposition, these provisions were deleted. The patsy is a
target of opportunity, not the source of ethical concern.4
Here, by way of contrast, is a snapshot of life in the Kelley, Drye
firm in the -early 1950s. I was in a senior partner's office when a call
came to him from the president of a corporate client. Here,
absolutely faithfully rendered, is the senior partner's half of the
dialogue:
Partner: I never said that what you're going to do is illegal.
I said I thought it was morally wrong.
Client...
Partner: You're absolutely free to go ahead, and I don't
think it will cost you anything-not unless you count it a
cost that I won't be your lawyer.
The senior partner was ready to give up a client for moral
principle. That was the world in which Paul and I grew up as lawyers.
We were told explicitly that Wall Street lawyers were the conscience
of the marketplace. Is it surprising we found awakening in us at the
same time deep disquiet about the world of lawyering we see about
us today? What has turned that world around? The love of money?
Paul may go through the formal motions of retiring from the
academic life; but he will never really retire, for he gets too much fun
out of it. That, I think, is very good news for American legal
education.

4. Roger C. Cramton, Ethical Dilemmas Facing Today's Lawyer, BAR LEADER,
Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 14, 16 (adapting remarks from address to the American Bar
Association Section of Tort and Insurance Practice).
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DANIEL H. POLLITr**

From The Left
I thought little of it more then twenty years ago when Paul
Haskell was invited to visit and teach the courses in Trusts and
Future Interests. He was recommended by John Scott, and that was
good enough for me. But then came antagonism, followed first by
admiration, and then by affection.
Paul and I are political junkies. We are of the World War II
generation and share memories of war time service (he in the Navy, I
in the Marines); the cold war days of Joe McCarthy; the Vietnam
War and Eugene McCarthy; and the long forgotten Korean conflict.
We can reminisce about Hubert Humphrey and the Civil Rights
efforts at the 1948 Democratic Convention; the 1964 Convention and
the fight over admission of the delegates from the Mississippi
Freedom Party. We talk about Ike, Adlai Stevenson, Estes Kefauver,
Sarge Shriver, J.F.K, L.B.J., and feel deeply about the issues these
memories evoke.
But we occupy opposite ends of the political spectrum. Paul
advises the conservative Federalist Society, I the ACLU. Paul heads
the North Carolina branch of the National Association of Scholars
(opposed to affirmative action in faculty hiring). I have a long
affiliation with Civil Rights groups, and as chair of the faculty
strongly supported the initiation of affirmative action.
Poles apart on issues we hold dear, rational discussion between
us was difficult when he first joined the faculty. After several strident
lunches, we tacitly agreed that he would go his way, I would go mine.
So it was for several years. But gradually came a grudging
admiration for his work as a scholar. Whenever I sought information
in his area of trusts (is it O.K. for a state to fund a scholarship limited
to African Americans?), Paul gave a quick answer, replete with more
then ample annotation.
His mind and energy are expansive. Basically a teacher of
property, wills and trusts, he extended his responsibilities into
teaching Professional Responsibility and a special course on Law and
Morality. He agreed to oversee the popular annual Dan K. Moore
Program on Ethics.
Most recently, rather then gently ease into retirement, Paul
*** Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
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chose to write a book (his fourth) in his new field of legal ethics.
Why Lawyers Behave As They Do is a highly readable account of
how the professional rules of conduct permit lawyers (if they so
mind) to wear moral blinders: to discredit adverse witnesses whom
the lawyers know are telling the truth; to exploit an adversary's
mistake (as to the time of a crime for example) and thereby obfuscate
the truth; to utilize dilatory tactics to wear down a weaker adversary;
to advise a client as to the de minimis consequence of a penalty and
thereby encourage unlawful conduct.
Paul's book, rightly, is highly acclaimed.
With time, Paul and I became acquainted on a personal level and
began to disagree on controversial matters without controversy; to
disagree without being disagreeable. We both had taught at
Georgetown Law School, and even lived in the same house in
suburban D.C. (I in the fifties, he in the sixties). It turned out that as
a law student I had a shipboard romance with his cousin Mimi on my
way to study at the Academy of International Law at the Hague.
I learned of his exploits on the basketball court while playing for
Lowell House in the Harvard inter-house league (Robinson Everett
led the arch-rival Adams House). He told of his sons' progress in the
academic world (one is now a Congressional Scholar) and I in turn
boasted of my children's work in public heath and legal services.
Our bonds of friendship strengthened a few years back around
issues growing out of a student body election. Aaron Nelson was a
candidate for student body president (he won hands down). On
election eve the right wing CarolinaReview blanketed the campus
with a publication featuring a cover picture of Aaron Nelson with
anti-Semitic overtones. Two of Nelson's fraternity brothers gathered
them up, and turned them over the next day to the student attorney
general.
There was an immediate campus uproar. A number of
prominent faculty wrote an open letter to Chancellor Hooker
protesting the anti-Semitism. After affirming the "'primacy'" and
" 'value' " of campus free speech, Hooker added that he wished " 'to
add his voice to those who ... find the article... deeply offensive and

altogether inappropriate.' "5
The faculty advisor resigned. There was no replacement. The
Carolina Review was doomed to die. Without a faculty advisor, it
could not function as a campus organization. Its voice was,muzzled.
5. John Sweeney, Hooker Slams Review Article, THE DAILY TAR HEEL (Chapel
Hill, N.C.), Feb. 26,1996, at 1 (quoting statement of Chancellor Hooker).
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Paul Haskell and I stepped into the breach. We agreed to serve,
and wrote the Daily Tar Heel that it would be a "shocking limitation
upon the freedom of expression" if a controversial periodical were
denied the right to publish because of the inability "to satisfy the
'6
technical requirement of a faculty advisor."
That was the first round. The second came when the student
Honor Court concluded that the two friends of Nelson were justified
in seizing the magazine because of its anti-Semitic tone and
character.
Haskell and I again entered the fray. We referred to the Tinker
arm-band case (students do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate")7 ; the
Terminiello breach of the peace case (free speech "may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it

...

stirs people to anger")'; the Cohen

"fluck the draft" case ("words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force") 9; and the Johnson flag burning case
("Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive") 0 . Our conclusion: no
matter how offensive, "[t]here is simply no justification for the
midnight seizure of an opponent's campaign literature.""
Paul Haskell is a straight shooter with a sensitivity to what is
right and what is wrong. He speaks his mind, no matter how
formidable the opposition, how damning the torpedoes.
On
retirement he loses his view of the football practice field and moves
to an interior office, the one next to mine. I welcome him as a
neighbor.

6. Paul G. Haskell & Daniel H. Pollitt, Letter to the Editor, THE DAILY TAR HEEL
(Chapel Hill, N.C.), Apr. 1, 1996, at 10.
7. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
8. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
9. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 (1971).
10. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989).
11. Daniel H. Pollitt & Paul G. Haskell, Freedom of the Press: An Addendum to the
Statement of Professors Haskell and Pollitt (1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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J. TURNIER**

Musings from a Friendand Neighbor
When I joined the law faculty twenty five years ago it seemed
that fully half of the faculty consisted of former trusts and estates
teachers. Anxious for a job I replied in the affirmative when asked if
I would replace a junior faculty member who, after one year in the
profession, looked forward to joining this elite group. Needless to
say, I was thrilled when four years later I learned that Paul G.
Haskell, a distinguished scholar in decedents' estates, would be
visiting at the school and I would be given a reprieve from teaching
trusts and estates for the upcoming academic year and, if he decided
to join the faculty, I might find myself permanently exempted from
such duties. This, however, was not my first contact with Paul
Haskell. Nearly a decade earlier, at the University of Virginia School
of Law, I had been a student in Tom Bergin's first year property
course, where, despite Tom's excellent teaching, I would have found
the whole field of future interest law to be unintelligible had it not
been for that splendid book, Preface to Estates in Land and Future
Interests, which Paul and Tom had put together to take students and
teachers alike through one of the law's most thorny thickets.
I was therefore delighted when I learned that Paul, after a visit
of two years, had decided to join the law faculty at the University of
North Carolina. I would be free to teach corporate tax indefinitely
and our students would benefit from the presence of a recognized
national authority in decedents' estates. I was also pleased to learn
that shortly after Paul decided to join the faculty on a permanent
basis, he and Sally decided to purchase a home down the street from
ours. Over the years my wife, Marif6, and our children have come to
appreciate Sally and Paul as good neighbors, amateur ornithologists,
and good friends. Our daughter Christine had her first automobile
accident in the Haskells' front yard and later remarked, based on
Paul and Sally's calmness, kindness and concern, that she could not
have picked a better place to put a car off the road.
My discussion thus far has primarily concentrated on Paul's
value to me. However important that might be to me as an
individual, it is transcended by his value to the legal academic
community. Since joining the faculty Paul has proved to be an
excellent colleague with deep institutional concerns as well as a
**** Willie Person Mangum Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
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dedicated scholar. Over the course of his academic career he has
authored eighteen law review articles and has authored or coauthored four books, several of which have been issued in second
editions.
An examination of Paul's corpus of scholarly production reveals
two rather remarkable features which are a tribute to him.
Paul has never lost his enthusiasm for engagement in serious
scholarship. Between his first article in 1964 in Georgetown Law
Journal2 and his most recent offering, a well regarded monograph
Why Lawyers Behave As They Do, published earlier this year, one
finds regular mileposts of articles and books which mark his course
through a life's work of scholarship. Such lifelong dedication to
scholarship is rare in legal education even among prominent scholars
at our most elite schools. Unfortunately, a flurry of scholarship at the
start of a teaching career with several well placed pieces in major
reviews followed by decades of silence punctuated by the occasional
article, book review, or casebook seems to be the pattern which
marks many successful academic careers even among the profession's
best and brightest. That Paul would have none of this is hardly
surprising.
It simply does not fit with either his sense of
professionalism or his no nonsense New England sense of personal
responsibility.
The second distinguishing feature of Paul's scholarly production
is its broad range, which is the product of a mind which is always
restless and in search of new ideas and horizons. Although he
established his academic reputation in the field of decedent's estates,
this did not prevent him from exploring other legal issues. With
decedents' estates as his North Star, he roamed the seas of legal
scholarship, with ports of call in education law, constitutional law,
legal education, moral analysis, and professional responsibility. Were
it not for this institution's omnipresent need for teachers of
decedents' estates, there is a good chance that the subjects which he
taught would be as varied as his scholarly offerings. Nonetheless,
since joining the faculty he found it possible to provide, in addition to
his normal offerings, courses in real estate finance, professional
responsibility, and law and morality. It therefore came as no surprise
when several years ago he announced that he and Professor Conley
were to teach a new course on the legal profession, a course for which
there were no prepared materials and, as far as I know, for which
12. Paul G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance:Proposalfor Reform, 52 GEo. L.J.
499 (1964).
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there was no precedent at any other law school.
In closing there is another aspect of Paul's persona which
deserves mention, his high sense of moral virtue. All too often we
hear criticism that the legal profession has lost its moral compass as
its members struggle to attain maximum legal advantage for their
clients within, and perhaps a bit beyond, the outer limits of what the
profession will tolerate. This does not characterize Paul's sense of
what is asked of the lawyer by society because it does not
characterize his sense of what is asked of an individual as a member
of society. Discussion of the moral element is rarely absent from his
normal discourse even on matters such as economics or sports. In a
conversation in the faculty lounge about college baseball with Paul
present one could count on his making a comment about something
such as the institutional immorality subjecting student athletes to a
long season and far away road trips. Fortunately for our friendship,
Paul is almost as tolerant of different points of view as he is certain of
the correctness of his own.
Although Paul has retired from the classroom, we his colleagues
are fortunate that he will be retaining an office in the law school and
we all know with certainty that he will retain his keen interest in a
wide range of legal topics. I am certain that sometime this fall or
next spring, while I am out walking my dog or he is out walking his,
we will meet down at the bottom of the hill, and full of enthusiasm,
Paul will tell me about an area of the law which he feels calls out for
scholarly attention, attention which he will provide with dedication
and moral bearing.

